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th Raúl Prebisch Lecture (2005) by the Nobel Laureate in Economics Lawrence Klein was 
significantly entitled “South and East Asia: Leading the World Economy”. The East Asian collapse 
first, and Asian spectacular growth performances in the post-crisis period then, and above all, have 
critically contributed to the awareness of the “new features of global interdependence” (Unctad 
2005; see also Reisen, Grandes and Pinaud 2005) stemming from the increasing relevance of Asia’s 
role in world economy. In one of the most intriguing, though highly disputed interpretation of the 
current world scenario, the international “non-system” (Williamson 1983) of the post-1971 era is 
replaced by a “Bretton Woods II” regime (Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber 2003) which – like 
its historical predecessor – fosters growth with stability while helping peripheral countries (then 
European nations and Japan with respect to the US and Britain, now Asia) to fill the gap with 
Western  nations  and  come  near  to  the  centre  of  the  system.  To  argue  that  Asia  is  currently 
compelling  Western  economists  to  get  consciousness  of  the  so  far  overlooked  complexity  of 
international economic relations seems no exaggeration. But the true reason for this might be that 
the prominent role played by Asian countries in world economy poses the challenge of the global 
imbalances. True, the current financial crisis is not the one – dollar plunge, sudden stop of capital 
flows from emerging markets to the US and global austerity programme – which had been predicted 
by the critics of the “Bretton Woods II” view about global imbalances, Nevertheless, Dooley et al. 
(2009) may be excessively optimistic when arguing that the system can continue to happily sustain, 
after the crisis, persistent and growing international imbalances such as those prevailing just before 
the 2007 subprime collapse.  
For the first time, perhaps, after the demise of Keynesianism in the Seventies, Keynes’s 
thought is becoming fashionable again and has been invoked as a possible remedy  against the 
economic  juggernaut  of  the  current  crisis.  The  last  and  highest  of  Keynes’s  intellectual 
achievements in international economics, the final configuration of that global monetary reform he   3 
had  been  trying,  without  success,  to  promote  throughout  the  whole  of  his  career  in  economic 
diplomacy, Keynes’s plans for Bretton Woods rightly deserve the attention they are attracting at the 
present time. Nevertheless, if such rediscovery is destined to improve our understanding of the 
current pattern of international relations, there might be reasons to rethink, more in general, the 
“focus and method” of Keynes’s work as an international economist (Vines 2003). This amount on 
the  one  side  to  enlarge  the  perspective  to  include  the  whole  bulk  of  analyses  he  advanced  to 
interpret international economic relations during substantially different economic epochs (from the 
pre-war gold standard to the return to gold in the Twenties, to the interwar period, to WWII and the 
transition to the new order) and the evolution of his reform schemes. On the other side, one should 
investigate  on  the possible persistence,  over  the  different  times  and  circumstances  of  Keynes’s 
writings and diplomacy, of a “method” of coping with the complexity of international relations, and 
speculate  about  the benefits  which  today’s policy-makers  could  derive  from  Keynes’s “vision” 
being offered a second chance.  
Accordingly, this paper deals with Keynes’s first major work, Indian Currency and Finance 
(1913), which fully shows the crucial role played by the dissemination of economic ideas from the 
periphery to the core of the global system in shaping a new vision about international monetary 
relations. Keynes’s fresh look at Asia (not only India, but also China and, on a general level, the 
whole continent) in the first years of the twentieth century provided him an alternative way of 
looking at the global order and the chance of using the Indian model to draw the lines of a qualified 
reform of the gold standard. In the attempt to revisit Indian Currency and Finance as such, that is as 
an essay in international economics belonging to the first era of globalization and a proposal for 
international reform, we stress the methodological continuity between this analysis and Keynes’s 
general treatment of the economic material and his way of reasoning about it, which are inspired in 
their turn to his approach to probability as a guide for action (see Carabelli 1988). In line with 
previous  works  on  the  method  of  Keynes’s  international  economics  and  economic  diplomacy 
(Carabelli and Cedrini 2008, 2007; Cedrini 2008), we thus focus in particular on those aspects of   4 
complexity,  interdependency  among  economic  variables  and  rationality  of  policy  on  which  the 
analysis of Indian Currency and Finance is built. Among the most important questions treated by 
Keynes while suggesting to use the Indian model as the cornerstone and an incentive for a European 
monetary reform, the nature and holding/hoarding of international reserves as well as the dynamics 
between debtor and creditor countries occupy prominent positions and are consequently dealt with 
in detail in the paper.  
It will not be difficult to recognize in these latter topics the two most controversial issues of 
the  current  “Bretton  Woods  II”  system,  large  hoarding  of  international  reserves  by  emergent 
nations, Asian countries in primis, coexisting with – and actually strengthening – huge, persistent 
deficits of the reserve country and locomotive of world growth. Intrigued by the parallel between 
Keynes’s early look at Asia for hints of monetary reform and current, Asia-driven new features of 
global  interdependence,  combining  valuable  opportunities  for  world  economy  with  significant 
threats to the stability of its growth patterns, we argue that the bequest of Keynes’s Indian Currency 
and  Finance  might  prove  appreciably  useful  to  speculate  about  the  sustainability  of  global 
imbalances and encourage the search for a new, Keynes-inspired global economic architecture.  
 
The spectacular effects of “a change of ideas in Asia” 
Although the target of powerful well-founded criticisms, the “Bretton Woods II” hypothesis is not 
without merits, as indirectly confirmed by the increasing use of it as a starting point for analyses of 
current  global  imbalances  and,  perhaps  more  directly,  by  its  persistence  despite  the  crisis  (see 
Dooley et al. 2009). The narrative induces to recognize the limits of unilateral views about global 
imbalances such as the “twin deficits” (Chinn 2005) and the “global saving glut” (Bernanke 2005) 
hypotheses, and helps rather to reason about today’s world economic landscape in systemic terms 
(Eichengreen 2004). Moreover, the hypothesis shows awareness of the multilateral character of the 
imbalances, in line with more sophisticated views like those advanced, among others, by Mann 
(2005)  –  the  imbalances  would  result  from  a  general  pattern  of  “global  co-dependency”   5 
transforming the US into a foreign source of growth for the rest of the world – and Kregel (2006), 
who argues that their origins are to be found in national or even regional policy choices, Europe and 
Japan too playing a relevant role in this sense.  
Still,  the  most  controversial  assumption  of  Bretton  Woods  II  is  that  global  imbalances 
appear  less  troublesome  if  one  argues  that  the  world  has  never  abandoned  its  most  successful 
monetary system. Export-led growth strategies supported by undervalued exchange rates, capital 
and  trade  controls,  and  international  reserves  accumulation  are  held  to  be  functional  to  Asian 
countries’ desire to cover that same road Europe and Japan traversed in the post-war period to 
regain a central position in the world economic system. The “trade account” region’s desire to 
export to the US requires Asian willingness to acquire US securities, whereas the “capital account” 
region, formed by Europe, Canada, Australia and Latin America, all currency floaters, is primarily 
interested in defending  its international investment position. That both regions have helped the 
central  country  finance  its  deficit,  the  former  through  accumulation  of  dollar  reserves  and  the 
latter’s investors pushing up the dollar until 2002, should come as no surprise. Asia would thus be 
expected to displace Europe in exporting to the US markets, and to buy out European claims on the 
US. Once its path to the centre is completed – hundreds of million underemployed workers still wait 
to  be  absorbed  into  the  modern  sector  –  the  revived  Bretton  Woods  system  would  engage  in 
reloading other peripheries like India.  
  Dooley  et  al.  (2003)  explicitly  focus  on  the  willingness  of  the  periphery  to  accumulate 
claims on the core, that is on the US, the reserve country. As many observers point out, the 1997 
Asian crisis has in fact taught developing nations that “undervaluation-cum-intervention” strategies 
(Unctad 2006), or self-protection through increased liquidity (Feldstein 1999) provide them with a 
powerful way out of the new Triffin paradox they were caught in during the Nineties, when foreign 
borrowing  to  achieve  the  desired  growth  rates  exposed  developing  countries  to  larger  external 
imbalances, raising the risk of reversals in capital inflows and consequent financial crisis (Kregel 
1999).  Asian  countries’  accumulation  of  export  surpluses  and  their  foreign  lending  through   6 
exchange reserves have produced “the largest foreign aid programme in world history” (Wolf 2005: 
25) and, together with increased surpluses in European economic giants, Japan, oil producers and 
other developing countries, allowed the US, the deficit-importer of last resort, to systematically live 
above its means. With the result, however, that unless one give credit to the view that despite the 
US financial crisis, the Bretton Woods II system permits the presence of large imbalances almost 
indefinitely over time (see Eichengreen 2004 and Roubini 2006 for criticisms to this belief), the 
leading superpower is compelled by its deficits to a severe readjustment, which may have extremely 
painful  repercussions  for  the  American  economy  as  well  as  for  multilateralism,  through  the 
recessionary effects of the required global rebalancing. 
  Although  contrary  to  standard  economic  theory,  as  well  as  to  the  rationale  of  the 
Washington Consensus as “policy prescription for development” (Williamson 2004), the so-called 
“paradox of capital” (Prasad, Rajan and Subramanian 2007) – capital should flow from rich to poor 
countries to exploit greater investment opportunities, thus easing the latter’s development strategies 
– seems not the historical accident of current times, but the rule of the post-war period (Kregel 
2004). The truly new phenomenon is rather that such outflows from emergent countries take the 
form  of  accumulated  international  reserves  (mostly  low-yielding  short-term  US  Treasury 
securities), which contribute to the financing of the US external deficit at low interest rates (see 
Summers 2006). There is widespread consensus on the use by emergent countries of large foreign 
currency reserves for precautionary motives – the need to avoid currency attacks as those which led 
to the 1997 collapse, in the absence of a global lender of last resort – but Asian nations in particular 
are generally blamed for holding and hoarding exchange reserves as part of mercantilist strategies 
(see  e.g.  Bergsten  2007).  “There  is  no  question”,  writes  Eichengreen  (2004:  3),  “that  their 
accumulation of reserves is a concomitant of intervention in the foreign exchange market to keep 
their currencies down, which is in turn a concomitant of the strategy of promoting exports as a way 
of stimulating growth”. Within the Bretton Woods II framework, it is exactly the intervention of 
Asian economies required to contrast their appreciation which on the one hand keeps exchange rates   7 
stable thus saving the dollar standard despite global imbalances and, on the other, allows the US to 
run continuous current account deficits, ultimately to the detriment of Asian countries’ interest in 
avoiding  capital  losses  on  their  reserves.  In  Bergsten’s  (2007)  somewhat  radical  words,  in 
particular, “China’s currency policy has taken much of Asia put of the international adjustment 
process” (ib.: 1). 
  As said, the view is not consensual: supporters of “the US deficit is logical” – i.e., it will 
persist over time – argument like Cooper (2006), among others, argue that global imbalances have 
relatively little to do with official support to the US deficits; international reserve accumulation 
would thus be a second-order issue (Caballero 2006). After recognizing that the growth in reserves 
may be in some cases “the incidental by-product of an active exchange rate policy”, Cooper (2006) 
states that by buying exchange reserves, Asian monetary authorities are in truth “investing abroad 
on behalf of the public”, due to limited investment opportunities at home and financial repression 
(in the case of China) and acting, due to higher yields on foreign assets (in the case of Japan) as 
financial intermediaries, “converting what private savers want now into what they will need in 
future  years”  (ib.:  7).  In  short,  high  savings  relative  to  investment  opportunities  and  the 
attractiveness of US financial assets would be responsible for large amounts of foreign funds in the 
US. A main problem with this interpretation is that, as pointed out by Roubini (2006), foreign 
central banks, rather than private investors, have provided a large part of the recent net financing for 
the US deficit, while private purchases of foreign assets by Americans more than compensate for 
private purchases of US assets by foreigners (see Eichengreen 2006).  
  In general, it seems difficult to deny that reserves accumulation has played and still plays a 
supportive role with respect to global imbalances: as Summers (2006) convincingly argues, the 
buildup in US net foreign debt is mirrored in dollar reserve accumulation by Asian and emerging 
countries. “It is an irony of our times that the majority of the world’s poorest people now live in 
countries  with  vast  international  financial  reserves”  (ib.:  8).  Yet,  IMF’s  October  2008  World 
Economic Outlook reports the astonishing 5,552.7 billion dollar bulk of emerging and developing   8 
countries’ reserves, and expects them to raise to 6,459.5 in 2009 – they combined to a total of only 
801.1 billion dollar in 2000 and 1,0729 in 2002. According to this data, developing countries hold 
two thirds of the global international reserve, whose magnitude increased from 1 trillion dollar in 
1990 to more than 5 in 2006; they account for the most part of the increase in global reserves-GDP 
ratio, from 5 (in 1980) to about 30%, while the ratio of industrial countries has been stable at 4% 
over the last decade. China accounts for an impressive 40% of total emerging countries’ reserves; 
her reserve/GDP ratio increased from 1% in 1980 to 41% in 2006.  India and developing Asia 
excluding China and India show similar reserves growth patterns (see Aizenman 2007, IMF 2008). 
China’s reserve/imports ratio raised over unity in 2004 to reach 166% at the end of 2008; the global 
ratio too increased from 44.9% in 2000 to 84.7% (IMF 2008). The traditional rule in this respect – 
reserves should be able to cover three months of imports – is thus enjoying overdue respect. The 
same  goes  for  the  Guidotti-Greenspan  rule  –  countries  should  hold  reserves  equal  to  foreign 
liabilities coming due within a year – (Rodrik, 2005).  
  On speculating about the Bretton Woods II hypothesis, most observers have commented that 
should international markets initiate the adjustment process through a US slowdown, as it happens 
in  current  times  of  financial  turmoil  and  exceptional  uncertainty,  emerging  countries  would 
probably realize that their exclusive reliance on export-led growth is likely to come at a high cost 
for their economies. Complementarity between the portfolio choices of private and public investors 
means that should central banks move away from the dollar, private investors would quickly follow, 
and  move  even  faster  (Roubini  2006);  moreover,  should  “nervous”  foreigners  doubt  about  the 
sustainability of the US position, central banks may find more and more difficult to cope with 
private  portfolio  adjustment  (Eichengreen  2004).  As  noted  by  Krugman  (2008),  capital  losses 
would prove to be larger than investors expect at the moment, if the decline of the dollar – gradual 
but fast enough to prevent not sustainable US debt accumulation – were to pose an end to global 
imbalances. Feldstein (2008) points out that this is the only available solution to produce the desired 
rebalancing, which will benefit from a surge in US savings driven by decreasing household wealth   9 
and  the  credit  crunch.  However,  this  amounts  to  recognizing  that  “the Chinese,  with  about $1 
trillion of U.S. bonds, are taking a risk that would have to be called imprudent” (ib.: 8). Allowing 
for these risks, why should then the “future of global economy [be] increasingly defined by a large 
flow  of  official  lending  from  developing  nations  to  the  world’s  largest  and  richest  economy” 
(Summers 2006: 8)?  
  A possible answer is that “Bretton Woods II still defines the international monetary system” 
(Dooley et  al.  09).  After  all,  as  recognized by  DeLong  (2009),  among  others,  “all  of  us  from 
Lawrence  Summers  to  John  Taylor  were  expecting  a  very  different  financial  crisis.  We  were 
expecting the 'Balance of Financial Terror' between Asia and America to collapse and produce 
chaos.  We  are  not  having  that  financial  crisis”.  Not  only  the  crisis  would  be  “not  directly  or 
indirectly caused by international imbalances that preceded it”, but “the incentives that drive the 
Bretton Woods II system will be reinforced by the crisis and, looking forward, participation in the 
system will expand and the life of the system will be extended” (Dooley et al. 09: 1). Relying on the 
reasonable expectation that countries with large reserves may perform better in the context of a 
global financial turmoil (see Aizenman 2009; Obstfeld, Shambaugh and Taylor, 2009), Dooley et 
al.  go  so  far  as  to  predict  that  “emerging  markets  will  be  even  more  convinced  that  reserve 
accumulation  and  export-led  growth  are  the  safest  development  strategy  in  an  uncertain  world 
(ib.:14). We will come back on the issue later on; for the moment, let us take a closer look at the 
literature on the puzzle and the costs of exchange reserves which has developed in recent years.  
  Once  identified  the  opportunity  cost  of  excess  dollar  reserves  in  the  cost  of  external 
borrowing for a country investing in US securities (see also Stiglitz 2003), Rodrik (2005) defines 
the “social cost of self-insurance” as the far from negligible spread between  yields deriving to 
central  banks  from  liquid  reserve  assets  and  the  private  sector’s  cost  of  borrowing  abroad. 
Excluding from the computation the reserves required to satisfy the three-months rule, 1 percentage 
point of GDP annually for developing countries is found by Rodrik to be lost in the process of 
reserve accumulation: “a multiple of the budgetary cost of even the most aggressive anti-poverty   10 
programs implemented in developing countries. And it is roughly the same order of magnitude as 
the projected gains for developing nations from a successful conclusion of the Doha round of trade 
negotiations” (ib.: 9). Moreover, he argues following Feldstein (1999), reserves accumulation is 
only one among various alternative strategies to increase liquidity, such as reducing short-term debt. 
Failure to combine this two strategies thus reveal another opportunity cost of reserves hoarding, and 
induce  to  reason  in  terms  of  moral  hazard  problems  and  macroeconomic  risks  (see  Cruz  and 
Walters 2008). Seen from a more general perspective, however, the puzzle of reserves is clearly 
connected with the new financial architecture that has emerged in the aftermath of the Nineties 
crisis.  Developing  countries  were  induced  to  opt  for  different  policy  choices  within  the  open 
economies  trilemma,  i.e.  managed  exchange  rates,  greater  monetary  independence  and  deeper 
financial integration: “hoarding international reserves is a key ingredient enhancing the stability of 
the emerging configuration in an era of greater financial integration” (Aizenman 2007: 2). Besides 
providing  self-insurance  against  the  possibility  of  sudden  stops  –  increased  sterilization  in 
developing countries since the Asian crisis acts as a signal that emerging markets value the benefits 
of sterilization much higher than its costs – hoarding international reserves contribute to mitigate 
the magnifying effects, for exporters of natural resources, of terms of trade shocks on real exchange 
rate volatility (ib.).  
  Now,  as  conveniently  stressed  by  Cruz  and  Walters  (2008),  “for  many  countries  the 
adoption of a reserve accumulation strategy was taken in the context of the decision to adopt or 
reinforce the neo-liberal strategy of rapid financial liberalisation, unrelated to the development of 
either deep financial markets or mature and effective regulatory structures” (ib.: 666-67). Excess 
reserves are thus fully embedded in the general recent story of shrinking policy space in the global 
environment (see Chang 2006): the rationale of the strategy would fall had aggressive financial 
liberalisation  not  so  heavily  reduced  policy  space  and  national  autonomy.  This  suggests  that  
alternative strategies such as capital controls and restrictions on currency convertibility .    11 
  While the precautionary motive may well apply to the case of Latin America, self-insurance 
seemingly  plays  a  lesser,  though  significant  role  in  Asia  –  the  leading  region  in  accumulating 
international  reserves.  Aizenman  (2007)  suggestively  advances  that  in  the  “Bretton  Woods  II” 
framework, coordination failures may encage countries adopting export-led growth policies into a 
“hoarding game” in which each mercantilist country seek to improve its own competitiveness on 
Western markets at the expenses of its neighbours (though running the risk of falling in a beggar-
thyself  trap)  by  the  use  of  reserve  hoarding  as  economic  weapons.  A  number  of  reasons  may 
explain  why  China,  in  particular,  is  playing  this  zero-sum  game:  the  seize  of  her  market,  low 
sterilization costs, a magnitude of growth with no historical precedents. As Rodrik (2005) points 
out, however, even mercantilist countries could refrain from accumulating excess reserves, if only 
they were able to control capital inflows effectively and prevent appreciation in a direct manner. 
“From this perspective too”, he argues, “there is a tradeoff between financial globalization and 
avoiding the cost of high level of reserves. Holding high reserves is the price to be paid for not 
managing the capital account more directly” (ib.: 4): a circumstance well-known to both foreign 
investors  in  China,  attracted  by  expectations  of  renmimbi  appreciation,  and  Chinese  monetary 
authorities, who fear that exchange rate volatility may lead to overheating of the economy and 
foster inflation.  
  In  many  senses,  the  puzzle  of  reserves  can  be  used  as  a  privileged  access  point  to  the 
dynamics of the Bretton Woods II system. Neither the cornerstone of a balance of terror nor, at least 
in the current crisis, the triggering mechanism for a world collapse driven by dollar plunge, capital 
losses for accumulating countries with consequent sudden stop of capital flows to the US, reserves 
hoarding rests a fundamental distinctive trait of the Bretton Woods II system. If the latter , even 
after the crisis, (still) defines the international monetary order, reserves hoarding (still) defines the 
Bretton Woods II system. This means that although reserves hoarding may be justified as a rational 
strategy  of  self-insurance  voluntarily  chosen  by  individual  countries  in  an  open  financial 
environment, it still has to pass the test of rationality once it is considered, as it should, as the   12 
outcome of that tacit coordination Dooley et al. place at the basis of the Bretton Woods II system 
itself.  After  revisiting  Indian  Currency  and  Finance,  where  Keynes  addresses  the  problem  of 
reserves hoarding in his proposal to look at Asia for a rational global monetary reform, we argue 
that Dooley et al. are probably right about the persistence of the BW2 system despite the financial 
crisis but wrong to reject a reform of the international order designed to overcome the major faults 
of today's system.   
 
A second glance at Keynes’s early international economics  
On reviewing the factors which make the current situation highly different from the golden era of 
Bretton Woods – capital flows dominating trade flows, large accumulations of international debt 
and volatile exchange rate – Kregel (2006) maintains that “the current environment looks much like 
the pre-Depression world that the architects of the Bretton Woods System were trying to banish 
from  existence  and  in  which  it  was  commonly  held  that  trade  flows  were  determined  by 
international capital flows. And earlier, in the 19
th century, it was understood that British foreign 
lending existed in order to finance the export of British capital goods. Indeed, British exporters 
often  organised  the  borrowing  to  support  the  lending  themselves”  (ib.:  154).  Keynes’s  Indian 
Currency and Finance may be regarded as a theoretical bridge between these two epochs of our 
monetary history, the pre-war gold standard and its evolution during the interwar period on the one 
side, and the Bretton Woods world on the other. According to Dimand (1991), in fact,  
Keynes’s proposal for a central bank and a managed currency rather than a return to the 
gold  standard  foreshadowed  the  advocacy  of  a  managed  currency  in  A  Tract  on 
Monetary Reform (1923), his opposition to Britain’s return to gold at the pre-war parity 
in 1925, and the celebrated ‘Auri Sacra Fames’ sections in A Treatise on Money (1930) 
and Essays in Persuasion (1931) on the irrational importance given to gold. The gold 
exchange  standard  that  Keynes  expounded,  and  contrasted  with  a  gold  standard,  in 
Indian Currency was a precursor of the Bretton Woods system (ib.: 29-20).  
 
The challenge is thus to find out reasons to believe – despite the time elapsed and the orthodoxy of 
Keynes’s thinking in those times, with respect to the revolution he was going to launch in the 
Thirties  –  that  Keynes’s  1913  proposal  for  a  European  monetary  reform  as  a  precursor  of  the   13 
Bretton Woods system may offer valuable insights to rethink about the current “Bretton Woods II” 
system.   
  At  the  epoch,  the  Indian  currency  system  was  one  of  the  most  discussed  issues among 
British  monetary  economists  (Moggridge  1992).  It  is  then  not  surprising  that  first-order 
contributions  to  monetary  thought  come  from  analyses  of  the  Indian  standard  and  its 
appropriateness  for  the  country  (Chandavarkar  1989).  By  1870,  the  core  countries  of  the 
international  monetary  system  had  abandoned  bimetallism  and  adopted  a  gold  standard,  thus 
reducing  the  international  demand  for  silver  at  a  time  when  its value  had  strongly  depreciated 
following the new supplies from mines in the American west. On a monometallic silver standard 
since 1835, India closed her mints to free coinage of silver in 1892. The value of the rupee was thus 
divorced from the value of the metal contained in it. The volatility of the gold value of the rupee 
had caused problems for both foreign traders and the government, which was under obligation to 
make large payments (the Home Charges) denominated in sterling. The government pegged the 
rupie to gold by maintaining sterling balances in London and a gold reserve at home, while money 
circulation  took  the  form  of  token  silver  and  paper  currency.  However,  the  Indian  Currency 
Committee (the Fowler Committee) of 1898-99 emphasized the internal circulation of gold as a 
fundamental pillar of the gold standard system on the British model, and prompted for a reform to 
endorse  it,  but  the  practical  attempt  to  introduce  gold  sovereigns  into  circulation  failed.  The 
Government of India then opted for shipping a vast part of the gold reserve to London, while the 
gold-exchange standard was maintained almost undisturbed until WWI. The main target of Indian 
Currency and Finance was to support the so-called Lindsay scheme (after the name of the deputy 
secretary  of  the  Bank  of  Bengala)  in  favour  of  the  gold-exchange  standard  as  against  the 
government’s opinion, and practical attempts to introduce a pure gold standard on this basis, that 
the  currency  system  as  it  had  evolved  after  1893  was  but  a  preliminary  step  towards  the 
implementation  of  the  London  model  (see  The  Collected  Writings  of  John  Maynard  Keynes  – 
hereafter: CW – I: 45-49).    14 
  As is widely known, claiming that India was “in the forefront of monetary progress” (CW I:  
69), Keynes came to describe the gold exchange standard as “the ideal currency of the future” (ib.: 
25).  Both  the  book  and  Keynes’s  contributions  to  the  Indian  Currency  Reports  were  widely 
acclaimed – not only by Marshall, who described the latter as “a prodigy of constructive work” (CW 
XV: 268). Notwithstanding its success, the book has received less attention than The Economic 
Consequences of the Peace and The General Theory (Dimand, 1991). Though substantial reasons 
can obviously be argued for this, part of the literature shows a certain degree of reluctance to rescue 
Indian  Currency  and  Finance  from  the  oblivion  in  which  it  seems  to  have  fallen,  as  if  either 
Keynes’s early loyalty to the quantitative theory of money in its Cambridge formulation (see CW 
XI: 18, Moggridge and Howson 1974; and Kregel, 1985), or the Indian-based focus of the essay 
(Williamson 1983; Sayers 1972 criticizes this view) make it almost impracticable to speculate about 
the continuity between the intuitions he made public in Indian Currency and Finance and his later 
suggestions  for  international  monetary  reform.  And  yet,  corroborated  by  the  use  of  some  far-
reaching essays on this topic, a second glance at Keynes’s “early economics” (Johnson and Johnson 
1978) may provide reasons to stress this continuity and substantiate the “back to Keynes” tendency 
of our troubled times.  
By  focusing  in  particular  on  The  Economic  Consequences  of  the  Peace  and  Keynes’s 
economic diplomacy in the aftermath of WWI, as well as on the most controversial episode of the 
latter, i.e. his call for an American Gift to Britain in 1945, we advanced elsewhere (Carabelli and 
Cedrini 2008; Cedrini, 2008), the hypothesis of consistency between, on the one side, Keynes’s 
conception and practice of economics, which qualifies him as a thinker of complexity (Marchionatti 
2009), and the “method”, i.e. the way of reasoning in economics (Carabelli 1988) underlying his 
approach  to  the  complexity  of  international  economic  relations.  It  is  quite  easy  to  view  his 
criticisms of the Treaty of Versailles and the multilateral approach he envisaged for the settlement 
of international imbalances brought about or consolidated by the war as shaped by the use of a 
method reflecting the characteristics of the complex material he had to investigate on. A method, in   15 
other  words,  enabling  Keynes  to  tackle  organic  interdependence  among  the  variables  of  the 
European system without theoretically reducing its complexity
1. This paper aims to enlarge our 
focus to Indian Currency and Finance, which was explicitly defined by Keynes as an essay in 
complexity: the attempt to bring out the fact, he wrote in conclusion, that  
the Indian system is an exceedingly coherent one. Every part of the Indian system fits 
into some other part. It is impossible to say everything at once, and an author must 
needs sacrifice from time to time the complexity and interdependence of fact in the 
interest of the clearness of his exposition. But the complexity and the coherence of the 
system require the constant attention of anyone who would criticize its parts. This is not 
a peculiarity of Indian finance. It is the characteristic of all monetary problems (CW I: 
181-82).  
 
A similar concern for the complexity of the material under investigation appears in Keynes’s first 
published article, Recent Economic Events in India (1909), where he had praised the virtue of the 
Secretary  of  State’s  action  in  supporting  exchange  on  the  London  money  market  at  a  time  of 
unfavourable  trade  balance  for  India.  Criticisms  of  the  government’s  action  were  based  on  “a 
mistaken view of the connection of events”, he stressed, but even 
those  who  have  tended  to  support  the  official  policy  have  treated  the  question  of 
exchange  and  the  balance  of  trade  as  an  isolated  problem  rather  than  as  part  of  a 
complex phenomenon presenting other sides of far-reaching importance (CW XI: 1). 
 
Thus, the attribute of complexity ideally opens and closes Keynes’s treatment of India’s “intricate 
and highly artificial system” (ib.). Complexity affects in truth the whole of Keynes’s work on this 
topic, and helps to enlarge our perspective of readers in search of his lessons for today’s world.  
  It should be firstly remarked that Keynes’s look was not confined to India. While making a 
study,  during  1910  and  1911,  of  British  gold  reserves  (see  CW  XV:  60),  Keynes  wrote  a 
Memorandum on a Currency System for China in favour of the proposal of the US government to 
introduce a gold exchange standard into China and other silver countries. Indian “not yet [...] ideal 
system” appearing (though not yet discussed at length) on the background of Recent Economic 
                                                 
1 Three major attributes of Keynes’s notion of complexity are inquired into detail in Carabelli and Cedrini 2008: i) 
organic interdependence, which underlies the whole analysis developed in Keynes’s pamphlet; ii) “tragic” dilemmas 
and fallacies of composition between particular and general interests, and iii) the need for “public” or social – that is, 
beyond the reach of the individual – solutions to be provided from external sources of relief but conceived, at the same 
time, as mechanisms to promote “shared responsibilities” approaches to international imbalances.   16 
Events in India is taken as a model for China in need of a currency system for internal circulation 
which must be able to prevent excess fluctuations of exchange and their harmful effects on foreign 
trade, i.e. it must “bear some fixed relation to the standard of nearly all other countries, namely 
gold” (ib.: 61). While gold shall be the standard, Keynes argued, the proper medium for circulation 
is  found  in  silver,  mostly  because  China  would  experience  major  difficulties  in  obtaining  the 
quantity of gold required for internal use. Keynes notes that “the monetary history of recent times 
has been steadily tending, especially in Oriental countries” (ib.), to a gold exchange standard. Since 
few countries were prepared, after the demise of bimetallism, to endorse pure monometallism, the 
widespread adoption of a hybrid model had popularised the use for internal circulation of silver 
coins whose value was maintained at par in relation to gold by means of a gold reserve to be used in 
case of a substantial drain of gold from the country for international payments, tending to depreciate 
the silver token coins. However,  
more recently, a more scientific and economical system than this has come into use. If 
the gold is only required for foreign payments and not for internal circulation, it is 
cheaper to maintain a credit at one of the great financial centres of the world, which can 
be converted with great readiness into gold when it is required, and which earns a small 
rate of interest when it is not required (ib.: 62).  
 
The latter was “a very vital point”, he observed with respect to China. The new silver coins should 
be “absolutely inconvertible” (ib.: 63) in the interior of the country; rather, the profits on the new 
coinage would be sufficiently large to form an adequate reserve; part of the proceeds of the sail in 
London of Chinese bills to foreign traders (on the model of Indian Council bills sold in London to 
the benefit of British importers) would have been used for the purchase of silver bullion from 
Chinese mints, while the rest could be invested in English Treasury Bills in London as a reserve. 
The profits, he added, would be so enormous that some part might be devoted to capital expenditure 
in China.  
  According  to  Keynes,  this  evolution  was  common  to  Holland  and  Austria-Hungary  in 
Europe; Mexico and Panama in America; India – “where it has been very severely and successfully 
tested during the last two years” (ib.) –, Philippines, Straits Settlements, Indo-China, Siam and Java   17 
in Asia; to which one should add Japan, whose system was not formally, but in practice a full gold 
exchange standard (the same for Russia). In short, it was “the prevailing form of currency in Asia” 
(ib.: 70), he was later to write in his article Recent Developments of the Indian Currency Question, 
which would have been expanded in the 1913 book. And truly, almost the whole world, except for 
Britain, “have introduced some form or other of the gold-exchange standard upon the Indian model” 
(ib.): a significant example was that of Germany, who was now opposing her own previous policy 
of pushing gold into circulation and rather transferring it in her central reserves.  
Already in Recent Developments, Keynes stressed that “while a gold standard has become 
almost universal, a gold currency is becoming rapidly obsolete” (ib.). He traced the origins of the 
rationale of the gold exchange standard back to the list of the system’s advantages given by Ricardo 
in the epoch of the Bullionist controversy, and quoted Mill and Goschen at its own support: the new 
system  
arouses  out  of  the  discovery  that,  so  long  as  gold  is  available  for  payments  of 
international indebtedness at an approximately constant rate in terms of the national 
currency,  it  is  a  matter  of  comparative  indifference  whether  it  actually  forms  the 
national currency (ib.).  
 
Its distinctive features were thus: 
first,  that  the  actual  medium  of  exchange  is  a  local  currency  distinct  from  the 
international currency; second, that the government is more ready to redeem the local 
currencies (rupies) in bills payable in international currency (gold) at a foreign centre 
(London) than to redeem it outright locally; and third, that the government, having 
taken  on  itself  the  responsibility  for  providing  local  currency  in  exchange  for 
international currency and for changing back local currency into international currency 
when required, must keep two kinds of reserves, one for each of these purposes (CW I: 
7-8).  
 
Keynes  believed  that  the  costs  of  gold  circulation  were  simply  not  sustainable,  while  large 
economies could derive from the use of cheaper substitutes; “and it has been found further that gold 
in the pockets of the people is not in the least available at a time of crisis or to meet a foreign drain. 
For these purposes the gold resources of a country must be centralised” (CW I: 50-51).  
  This leads Keynes to discuss more in detail the question of Indian reserves. The stability of 
the system, he stressed, simply depends on the Secretary of State’s keeping an adequate amount of   18 
reserves  of  coined  rupees  (liquid  reserves  in  sterling)  to  enable  him  to  exchange  international 
currency  (local  currency)  for  local  currency  (international  currency,  when  required).  India’s 
complicated reserve system at those times included a currency reserves, depending on the amount 
of  notes  in  circulation,  and  a  gold  standard  reserve,  depending  upon  the  profits  deriving  from 
coinage of token silver rupees. The reserve of coined rupees was held partly in the currency reserve, 
and partly in the gold standard reserve; the reserve of gold was held in the currency reserve, while 
the reserve of loans at call was held in the gold standard reserve. Finally, sterling securities were 
held partly in the currency, partly in the gold standard reserve. The rationale of the system was that 
the currency reserve kept rupees which might have been required to meet a reduction in the volume 
of notes, while the gold standard reserve kept those rupees which should have left India in case of 
unexpectedly  huge  sales  of  Council  bills  in  London.  According  to  Keynes,  “the  only  point  of 
importance is that the aggregate reserve of coined rupees should not be larger than is necessary, and 
its location is mainly a matter of book-keeping” (ib.: 74).  
  As Keynes himself had emphasized in a letter to the Editor of The Times on December 14
th, 
1912, the proper object of a good currency “is to combine cheapness with stability” (CW XV: 91). 
The Indian Currency and Finance proposals point at both. The gold exchange standard, Keynes 
remarked, worked not differently from a pure gold standard with respect to the level of prices, while 
its indirect effect on prices was similar to the effect of the use of any other medium of exchange so 
as to economize gold. As to the margins of discretion allowed by the system in excess with respect 
to its pure version, they were limited to the choice of the magnitude of the reserve of coined rupees 
and  to  temporary  postponement  of  the  demand  for  rupees  (CW  XV:  76-77).  It  is  precisely  to 
combine  cheapness  with  stability,  however,  that  a  currency  system  is  required  to  prevent  gold 
circulation.  
A preference for a tangible gold currency is no longer more than a relic of a time when 
governments were less trustworthy in these matters than they are now, and when it was 
the fashion to imitate uncritically the system which had been established in England 
and had seemed to work so well during the second quarter of the nineteenth century 
(CW I: 51).   19 
 
Keynes  observed  that  the  Indian  people  destined  huge  amounts  of  their  wealth  to  the  barren 
accumulation  of  gold,  and  that  gold  was  “hoarded,  used  as  jewellery,  as  gilding,  even  [...]  as 
medicine” (ib.: 54). Even sovereigns displacing  rupees in some parts of the country after their 
importation in 1912, he stressed, were serving purposes of hoarding, rather than being employed as 
medium of exchange. The same for the amount of sovereigns introduced into circulation in line 
with  the  Fowler  Committee  in  1898,  which  was  partly  exported  (half  was  returned  to  the 
Government), while the rest (the greater part of the total amount) reached bullion-dealers. Keynes 
was against both the proposal for coinage of sovereigns at Bombay and, as said, the government’s 
attempt to force sovereigns into circulation.  
“India, as all we know, already wastes far too high a proportion of her resources in the 
needless accumulation of the precious metals. The Government ought not to encourage 
in the slightest degree thus ingrained fondness for handling hard gold. By import taxes 
on  both  precious  metals  and  by  their  elimination,  to  the  utmost  extent  that  public 
opinion will permit, from amongst the circulating media of the country, they ought to 
counteract an uncivilised and wasteful habit” (CW XV: 81). 
 
“Extravagant and wasteful” as it may be, the Government’s proposal would “diminish, and not, as 
its advocates claim for it, increase the stability of the currency system as a whole” (ib.: 63). Indeed, 
he was in favour of abolishing, rather than extending facilities for the use of gold in the country. 
Otherwise,  Indian  would  have  unduly  renounced  to  the  21  million  sterling  coming  from rupee 
coinage, as well as to interests on the invested portion kept in the currency reserves (£300,000 
annually). Moreover, with gold replacing notes – i.e. the cheapest available tool, strongly supported 
by Keynes, for allowing the currency the desired degree of seasonal elasticity – both the currency 
and  the  gold  standard  reserves  would  have  been  weakened.  Keynes  exposed  a  further,  subtle 
argument against the proposal. “It is tacitly assumed”, he stressed, “that the greater part of what has 
to be withdrawn from the circulation at a time of crisis would come from the gold portion of the 
circulation” (CW I: 64). But he believed this to be contrary to general experience: “at a time of 
crisis it is the fiduciary coins which the public are most eager to part with” (ib.). Bankers and the   20 
public would keep their currency surplus in the form of gold, thus weakening the existing reserves 
without reducing the amount of prudential reserves the government should keep.  
  Keynes’s  main  argument  against  financial  purists  is  that  it  is  not  possible  to  devise  in 
abstract, i.e. without precise reference to the specific evolution and nature of a country’s financial 
institutions and capital and money markets, the ideal currency system valid for all contexts, times 
and  circumstances  (see  Vicarelli  1989;  Ferrandier  1985).  Peculiar  position  in  the  international 
money market, the relation to financial centres and even national customs with respect to currency 
add to these factors to make the ideal system country-specific. Chapter 2 of Indian Currency and 
Finance derives its strength from Keynes’s analysis of the respective peculiarities which distinguish 
the “core” system of Britain, a creditor country and “the envy of the rest of the world” since 1870 
(CW  XV:  77),  from  the  “peripheral”  system  of  India,  a  debtor  nation.  The  “tacit  assumption” 
recalled above is a powerful example of how misleading might be the proposal of favouring of gold 
circulation if the British model is unduly applied, with no qualification, to the Indian system: “the 
conventional idea of ‘sound’ currency is chiefly derived from certain superficial aspects of the 
British system” (CW I: 11). Although the 1848 Bank Act had been successful in preventing gold 
economies  by  the  use  of  notes,  its  main  purpose  was  almost  nullified  by  the  development  of 
cheques as medium of exchange, which led to “a monetary organisation more perfectly adapted for 
the economy of gold than any which exists elsewhere” (ib.: 11-12). The main problem of uncritical 
imitation of the British model, of its form rather than substance, by a country like India (and most 
European nations) lies in that  
the position of a country which is preponderantly a creditor in the international short-
loan market is quite different from that of a country which is preponderantly a debtor. 
In the former case, which is that of Great Britain, it is a question of increasing the 
amount lent; in the latter case it is a question of increasing the amount borrowed. A 
machinery which is adapted for action of the first kind may be ill suited for action of 
the second. Partly as a consequence of this, partly as a consequence of the peculiar 
organisation of the London money market, the ‘bank rate’ policy for regulating the 
outflow of gold has been admirably successful in this country, and yet cannot stand 
elsewhere unaided by other devices (ib.: 13).   21 
The “other devices” are: large gold reserves, suspension of gold payments and keeping foreign 
credit and bills which can be withdrawn in case of outward drain of gold. It is typical of countries 
with limited financial strength such as European countries except for France (using the first two 
methods) and Germany (using the last two), Keynes maintained, that their central banks largely 
depend on holdings of foreign bills and foreign credit. This particular form of holding reserves was 
a  growing  tendency  at  the  epoch.  Its  rationale  was  to  be  found  in  that  while  Britain,  as  an 
international short-term lender, could quickly reduce its loans to foreign countries and reduce the 
balance of indebtedness in her favour by the use of bank-rate policy,  
in countries where the money market is already a borrower rather than a lender in the 
international  market  ...  A  direct  policy  on  the  part  of  the  central  bank  ...  must  be 
employed. If the money market is not a lender in the international market, the bank 
itself  must  be  at  pains  to  become  to  some  extent  one  ...  by  itself  entering  the 
international money market as a lender at short notice, place itself in funds, at foreign 
centres, which can be rapidly withdrawn when they are required. The only alternative 
would be the holding of a much larger reserve of gold, the expense of which would be 
nearly intolerable. The new method combines safety with economy ... This is not the 
expedient of second-rate or impoverished countries; it is the expedient of all those who 
have not attained a high degree of financial supremacy – of all those, in fact, who are 
not themselves international bankers (ib.: 18-19). 
 
Keynes even offered a realistic map of the international monetary system, a much more detailed one 
than that we are reporting here, with Britain and France, short-term creditor countries, at the one 
end of it, and Germany, a creditor in relation with her neighbours but a debtor in relation to the 
great creditors (Britain, the US and France) in an intermediate position. Then Russia and Austria-
Hungary, “rich” debtor nations. “From the currencies of these it is an easy step to those of the great 
trading nations of Asia – India, Japan, and the Dutch East Indies” (ib.: 19).  
To say that the gold-exchange standard merely carries somewhat further the currency 
arrangements which several European countries have evolved during the last quarter of 
a century is not, of course, to justify it. But if we see that the gold-exchange standard is 
not, in the currency world of to-day, anomalous, and that it is in the main stream of 
currency evolution, we shall have a wider experience on which to draw in criticising it, 
and may be in a better position to judge if its details wisely ... The proper solution for 
each country must be governed by the nature of its position in the international money 
market and of its relations to the chief financial centres, and by those national customs 
in matters of currency which it may be unwise to disturb. It is as an attempt to solve 
this problem that the gold-exchange standard ought to be judged (ib.: 21). 
   22 
Although country-specific (as for the amount itself of reserves, which in India must be exceedingly 
large  because  of  wide  fluctuations  in  prosperity  and  trade,  and  the  lack  of  international  stock 
exchange securities against large foreign liabilities), different choices in matters of currency did not 
diverge  so  much  as  to prevent  Keynes  from  declaring  that  there  were  prevailing  tendencies to 
introduce a gold exchange standard both in Europe and in Asia, containing at least “one essential 
element – the use of a cheap local currency artificially maintained at par with the international 
currency or standard of value (whatever they may ultimately turn out to be) – in the ideal currency 
of the future” (ib.: 25).  
  Nonetheless, in the case of India, this requires intensification of the public effort against 
hoarding, which would otherwise lead to lose and substantially waste gold resources required in the 
event  of  crisis.  Keynes  admits  that  the  suspicion  with  regard  to  the  holding  of  Indian  gold  in 
London is perfectly legitimate, although for the Secretary of State it would be easy to dispose of 
part of this gold even if the latter was kept in India. Again, a debtor in relation to Britain, India 
should necessarily use its gold reserves to discharge its debts in case of stringency in the London 
market, since Britain would quickly dry up new loans to the Indian market or decide not to renew 
the already existing ones. India would be thus forced to add gold to its exports in view of paying 
what she owes: holding gold reserves in London would amount to save time and lead to much less 
onerous  financial  operations  (Keynes  was  later  to  stress  that  the  gold  exchange  standard  had 
enabled India to meet the August 1914 crisis better than any other country. See CW XI: 275).  
Gold reserves are meant to be used in times of difficulty, and for the discharge of 
pressing obligations. It is absurd for a man with a large balance at his bank to default to 
his creditors, because a feeling of jealousy, in regard to any one in whose favour he 
draws  a  cheque,  prevents  him  from  ever  drawing  one.  Mr.  Bagehot  certainly  did 
England a great service in dissipating from the minds of her financiers this primitive 
prejudice  –  for  wonderfully  few  other  countries  have  yet  learn  that  gold  reserves, 
although no doubt they serve some purpose when they are held for show only, exist to 
much better purpose if they are held for use also (ib.: 125). 
 
“Various  stirring  of  the  original  sin  of  mercantilism”,  India’s  “jealousy  of  the  too  powerful 
magnates of the London money market” as well as of the Secretary of State, and even Britain’s   23 
“jealousy” of Indian gold, which she could consider as “her own war chest”: “all combine to make a 
powerful, natural, and yet unfounded prejudice which it is exceedingly difficult to combat” (ib.: 
125-26).  
  The sink of precious metals, according to Jevons’s well-known dictum, India was functional 
to Western interests in price stability. India’s “love” of gold, “ruinous though it has been to her own 
economic  development,  has  flourished  in  the  past  to  the  great  advantage”  (ib.:  70)  of  Europe. 
Keynes stressed that Indian demand for gold had been and was, “at a time of plentiful gold supply 
like the present, a true friend to the City and an enemy of inflation” (ib.). In The General Theory, 
however, he was to stress that “the history of India at all times has provided an example of a 
country impoverished by a preference for liquidity amounting to so strong a passion that even an 
enormous and chronic influx of the precious metals has been insufficient to bring down the rate of 
interest  to  a  level  which  was  compatible  with  the  growth  of  real  wealth”  (CW  VII:  337). 
Chandavarkar (1989) notes that Keynes did not fail to envision “futuristic scenarios involving a 
reversal of roles” (ib.: 91). His proposed reforms for the country were based on Indians’ learning 
“to leave off their infertile habits and to divert their hoards into the channels of productive industry 
and to the enrichment of their fields” (CW I: 70). Should this occur with Indian demand for gold 
reducing gradually over time, Europe would be no more insulated from abrupt changes in world 
prices. “Yet if the change comes at a time of big new production, she may involve the world, 
nevertheless, in a very great inflation of world prices” (ib: 70-71). But Keynes is doing more than 
evoking a futuristic scenario.  
If India is thus to turn the tables on the West, she must not delay too long. The time 
may not be far distant when Europe, having perfected her mechanism of exchange on 
the basis of a gold standard, will find it possible to regulate her standard of value on a 
more rational and stable basis. It is not likely that we shall leave permanently the most 
intimate adjustments of our economic organism at the mercy of a lucky prospector, a 
new chemical process, or a change of ideas in Asia (ib.: 71). 
 
The various “futuristic” scenarios drawn by Keynes in his writings are more often than not an 
attempt to promote reform plans designed to revolutionize the present rather than a pure speculation   24 
about changing times and circumstances requiring, in the future, different ways of coping with 
given problems. Not to mention but a well-known example, even his Economic Possibilities for Our 
Grandchildren were published as one of the Essays in Persuasion: the core message of the writing 
is posed at the service of public action reversing the “progress towards negation” (CW XXI: 40) 
policy followed by the government – see a 1931 letter to W.S. Woytinsky of the German Trade 
Union  Federation,  where  Keynes  admits  that  he  wrote  the  Essays  in  Persuasion  “for  popular 
consumption against deflationists in this country” (reported in Ruiz 2009: 2-3; see Carabelli and 
Cedrini 2009). As we argue in below, the prospected reversal of role between Asia and the West in 
Indian Currency and Finance thus appears as a device introduced by Keynes, consistently with the 
use he made in all his writings of this word, to reinforce the case for European monetary reform 
driven by, and based upon, rationality. 
  
Indian Currency and beyond 
The discussion reported above on the effects of the dynamics between creditor and debtor countries 
for the international monetary system should suffice to cast doubts on Williamson’s criticism about 
Johnson and Johnson's (1978) interpretation of Keynes's early economics. According to the former, 
the latter would be wrong to pose Indian Currency and Finance at the basis of Bretton Woods and 
possibly  Keynes’s  International  Currency  Union  plan,  because  in  the  book  “Keynes  was  quite 
unambiguously  concerned  with  exploring  the  rational  policy  for  a  single  country  that  was 
sufficiently small to take the systemic behavior as parametric” (Williamson 1983: 109). Williamson 
notes that Keynes’s proposals for the 1922 Genoa conference did not even mention withdrawing 
gold from circulation and centralizing it in reserves available for international payments. Moggridge 
(1986) suggests that the explanation for this is probably to be found in Keynes’s concern, at those 
times, for excessive rather than deficient international liquidity. On the contrary, by examining Del 
Vecchio’s review of Indian Currency and Finance in 1920, De Cecco (1985) notices that Keynes 
had simply failed to realize that although a gold exchange standard could be a viable solution for   25 
colonial territories, sovereign countries enabled to politically manage foreign exchange balances 
would  have  not  accepted  it.  According  to  De  Cecco,  Britain’s  Genoa  proposals  for  the 
establishment of a London-led gold exchange standard was a conscious “policy of despair” (ib.: 51) 
driven by pessimism on the use of bank rate, which the Cunliffe Report considered as operating 
through changes in the volume of output and employment, as a tool for international monetary 
policy. 
  Indirectly,  De  Cecco  confirms  that  Indian  Currency  and  Finance  is  also  an  essay  on 
international monetary reform. It seems quite difficult to deny validity to Dimand’s (1991) view 
that Indian Currency and Finance already shows Keynes’s “desire to devise a stable international 
monetary system that would be more flexible and less wasteful of resources than the gold standard 
and his emphasis on the crucial role of central banking in managing such a system” (ib.: 34). In the 
book, Keynes advocates the creation of a State Bank of India substituting for the Presidency Banks 
of Bombay, Calcutta and Madras. The Indian monetary system had “much to learn from what is 
done elsewhere” (ib.: 182) in matters of banking arrangements, management of note issue and in the 
relation  of  the  government  to  the  money  market.  The  mind  easily  goes  to  the  US  and  the 
establishment of the Federal Reserve System. Both India and the US were in fact large agricultural 
countries with cyclical fluctuations in the demand for funds to move the crops but inelastic supply 
of money-proper and no countervailing elasticity in bank money. To eliminate fluctuations, the 
government should have hold unduly voluminous amounts of exchange reserves so as to be able  
to meet the swings in the demand for credit between busy and slack seasons in the crop cycle. 
Keynes's  proposal  was  thus  to  improve  elasticity  of  domestic  money  supply,  thereby  avoiding 
volatility of discount rates (see Chandavarkar 1985; for a comment on the presumed conservative 
character of Keynes’s scheme, see Moggridge 1992; Johnson and Johnson 1978). In Mehrling's 
(2009) words, Keynes was trying to “improve banking institutions in order to reduce the social cost 
of banking operations, both in terms of price volatility and risk premiums, but in general it will not 
be  possible  or  desirable  to  drive  the  risk  premium  to  zero  by  absorbing  all  the  risk  on  the   26 
government’s balance sheet. In this respect, it is remarkable that Keynes holds out India's gold 
exchange system as an innovation to be admired” (ib.: 7). Taken together with his suggestions to 
counteract the hoarding of gold, this proposal by Keynes – the main target of the memorandum on 
the  Indian  State  Bank  he  attached  to  the  Royal  Commission  report  required  after  the  Marconi 
scandal, as Johnson and Johnson (1978) argue, was to establish an economical currency system, i.e. 
“one that would not tie up an excessive amount of resources in barren reserves” (ib.: 114) – was the 
first of a long future series based on recognition that “instead of having rigid rules shackling the 
economy’s performance, monetary institutions should be molded with sufficient flexibility to allow 
the pursuit of domestic targets” (Cesarano 2003: 492). 
  A proper analysis of the “method” – in the sense used by Ferrandier 1985 and Vines 2003 – 
used by Keynes to deal with the complexity of the Indian system and the international monetary 
order which the widespread application of that model would have given life to may offer support to 
the view that Indian Currency and Finance provide clear continuity with Keynes’s later reform 
schemes. As seen, a key concept in Keynes’s analysis is that of rationality. Recent Developments of 
the  Indian  Currency  Question  (the  same  goes  for  Indian  Currency  and  Finance)  begins  with 
extremely interesting comments by Keynes on the evolution of the Indian currency system since 
1899, which had been 
silent but rapid. There have been few public pronouncements of policy on the part of 
the Government, and the legislative changes have been insignificant (ib.: 67).  
 
“Yet a system has been developed”, he remarked, 
which was contemplated neither by those who effected nor by those who opposed the 
closing of the mints in 1892 and which was not favoured either by the Government or 
by the Committee of 1898, although something resembling it was brought before them  
(ib.).  
 
Lindsay’s revenge, in other words. After all, notes Keynes, he had always maintained: “They must 
adopt  my  scheme  despite  themselves”  (ib.:  71).  Although  that  of  the  Indian  system  was 
undoubtedly a positive, unintended evolution,   27 
the fact that the Government has drifted into a system and has never plainly set it forth, 
is responsible for a great deal of the misapprehension regarding its true nature which 
exists in the minds not only of the public, but also of some Government officials (ib.: 
67).  
 
This could compensate the advantages deriving from the fact that  
The details of the gold standard are difficult and complicated, but there is not the least 
need for anyone who uses the coin to understand the system on which it is based. In 
India very few traders even understand it. Only those who actually control the system 
need appreciate the details (ib.: 63).  
 
This digression on the unintended effects of currency policy (of a similar kind of that concerning 
Britain’s 1848 Bank Act, cited above) induces to rethink the use Keynes makes of the concept of 
rationality. In his introduction to the Series of Cambridge Economic Handbooks, 1922-3, Keynes 
writes:  “The  theory  of  economics  does  not  furnish  a  body  of  settled  conclusions  immediately 
applicable to policy. It is a method rather than a doctrine, which helps its possessor to draw correct 
conclusions” (CW XII: 856) and to avoid falling into logical fallacies in reasoning, like the fallacy 
of composition. Keynes’s way of reasoning in economics is in fact a non-demonstrative logic, based 
upon  probability,  which  is  but  a  logical  relation  between  propositions  or  arguments,  between 
premises  and  conclusions.  The  material  of  probability  consists  of  propositions,  i.e.  on  reasons, 
grounds or evidence supporting the relation of probability. For Keynes, limited knowledge does not 
rule out the possibility to form individual reasonable judgements: having “some reason” (ground or 
evidence)  “for  expecting”  and  acting,  he  writes  in  the  Treatise  on  Probability,  is  a  sufficient 
condition to form a reasonable judgement and a reasonable action (CW VIII: 277). Indian Currency 
and Finance is one of the best example (consider CW XV: 69, line 11: “I will endeavour to give 
reasons for thinking...”, and line 22: “I will ... give reasons against...”) of Keynes’s belief that “in 
economics you cannot convict your opponent of error – you can only convince him of it. And, even 
if you are right, you cannot convince him, if there is a defect in your powers of persuasion and 
exposition or if his head is already so filled with contrary notions that he cannot catch the clues to 
your thought which  you are trying to throw to him” (CW XIII: 470). The mind easily goes to   28 
purists’ views about gold circulation. Likewise, Keynes held that it was only under the influence of 
a major crisis that proposals for a state bank could be given the due attention (see CW I: 168). 
  For  Keynes,  probability  is  the  hypothesis  upon  which  it  is  reasonable  for  us  to  act  in 
condition of limited knowledge (CW VIII: 339; see in general Carabelli 1988), so that the general 
principles  which  rule  human  conduct  are  also  those  which  rule probable  reasoning.  The above 
passages about the unintended consequences of currency policy give an illustration of Keynes's 
belief that what matters is reasonableness – neither absolute rationality nor truth – of judgement and 
action, and that reasonableness does not depend on the success or fulfilment of expectations: mere 
luck does not turn foolish judgements into reasonable judgements. Moreover, reasonableness is 
contingent to changeable cognitive circumstances. In politics and economic policy-making, we have 
to take a decision without knowing the truth, and deliberate on the basis of probability and likeness. 
This  does  not  translate,  however,  into  arbitrariness  or  irrationality  of  political  decisions.  As 
Carabelli and De Vecchi (2000) point out, Keynes constantly opposes the idea of natural order and 
selection,  and  always  rejects  policy  spontaneity,  which  is  always  negatively  associated,  in  his 
thought,  with  instinct,  blindness  and  chance,  i.e.  absence  of  deliberation.  In  fact,  Keynes 
distinguishes  between  institutions  and  spontaneous  social  practices,  which  rely  on  habits  and 
traditions. The former are collective agents having a mind and a will, depending on partial reason 
and  probable  judgement:  “in  cases  of  social  need,  institutions  should  compete  with  and  try  to 
contrast ethically undesired social practices and conventions” (ib.: 231), and “schemes conceived by 
the mind” replace “undesigned outcome of instinct” (CW XVII: 453). Take the main message of the 
Monetary Reform:  
we  must  free  ourselves  from  the  deep  distrust  which  exists  against  allowing  the 
regulation of the standard of value to be the subject of deliberate decision. We can no 
longer afford to leave it in the category of which the distinguishing characteristics are 
possessed in different degrees by the weather, the birth-rate, and the Constitution, – 
matters which are settled by natural causes, or are the resultant of the separate action of 
many individuals acting independently, or require a Revolution to change them (CW 
IV: 36). 
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Endowed with partial knowledge and reasonableness, institutions are deliberately designed social 
remedies,  that  is  remedies  beyond  the  reach  of  the  individual,  and  should  be  guided  by  their 
capability to oppose the negative effects of complexity and organic interdependence characterizing 
society and economic organization, such as fallacies of composition, market failures, conventional 
expectations derived from uncertainty and ignorance. The economists’ task is to find out new tools 
and principles of policy to control and intervene in the working of economic forces, with the aim of 
promoting social stability and justice.  
  Social rules themselves should be made the object of revision on more rational criteria. 
Policy  should  in  fact  be  “wise”,  i.e.  reasonable.  Consider  again  the  Monetary  Reform:  the 
alternative  to  gold,  “our  golden  opportunity”,  was  just  “our  existing  system,  but  worked  self-
consciously and for a wise, deliberate purpose” (ib.: 161). Wisdom here refers to practical human 
reasonableness  and  prudence,  i.e.  to  assigning  due  attention  to  changing  circumstances.  Policy 
should be based upon correct principles like cleverness and goodness, reason and intellect; since 
“they mould the future and cannot be loyal to the past” (Carabelli and De Vecchi 2000: 238), 
however, public institutions should show non-conformist and non-conventional attitudes. Since they 
possess a greater store of knowledge, though still partial, than the individual, they are best placed to 
decide and act precisely in those cases in which uncertainty and ignorance force the latter to adhere 
to average opinion and conventions: state intervention acts to modify public opinion so that a new, 
less  harmful  convention  may  be  established.  Discretionary  policy,  Keynes  adds,  is  a  “rational 
construction”, in need of “constructive proposals” (CW XXVII: 138).  
  A  direct  illustration  of  this  in  Indian  Currency  and  Finance  is  provided  by  Keynes’s 
argument for moderating the amount of India’s total reserves: “it would be extravagant [for India] 
to maintain a reserve adequate for all conceivable emergencies” (CW I: 120), since the Secretary of 
State could always borrow by issuing India bills. In India, he stresses, all available resources are 
required for capital expansion: it is “not sound or humane policy to burden the present as much as 
for the sake of the future” (ib.). Of course, this owes much to the fact that “few countries have so   30 
good a market for their loans at a foreign centre as India” (ib.). As seen, however, Indian Currency 
and Finance is more in general an illustration of Keynes’s belief that not only ignorance about the 
future should not paralyze public policy but also, and most of all, that “the future will be what we 
choose  to  make  it”  (CW  XXVI:  260).  Compare  Indian  Currency  and  Finance  insights  with 
Keynes’s comments on the 1914 crisis. In his reconstruction, the collapse is due to foreign debtors’ 
inability to remit funds to meet their obligations to Britain. Specie payments had been suspended, 
and the ability of the Bank of England to draw gold severely impaired: due to the “uncertainties of 
war”, in fact, “as usual, most countries refused to use their  gold reserves and preferred sterile 
hoards to the fulfilment of their obligations” (CW XI: 259):  
“although many countries hold large quantities of gold, there are but few which pursue 
a rational policy in regard to it. At considerable cost they build up large reserves in 
quiet  times  presumably  with  a  view  to  the  next  crisis;  but  when  the  crisis  comes 
mistaken policy renders them as little able to use gold as if it were not there at all” (ib.: 
247).  
    
The rationale of the enormous accumulation of gold reserves during the last fifteen years before the 
crisis, Keynes noted in November 1914, had been “only dimly conceived by the owners of them. 
They  have  been  piled  up  partly  as  the  result  of  blind  fashion,  partly  as  the  almost  automatic 
consequence, in an era of abundant gold supply, of the particular currency arrangements which it 
has been orthodox to introduce. The actual amount of gold held in reserve has been in only a very 
few cases the result of a deliberate choice” (ib.: 312). Occasionally, he added, panic had been the 
motive underlying a revision of ideas about reserves. True, the management of reserves is not a 
science. Due to the vague nature of the contingencies motivating the  holding of reserves, “the 
problem  of  assessing  the  proper  ratio  [is],  within  wide  limits,  indeterminate”  (ib.:  313). 
Nonetheless, though Britain is a relevant exception in this respect (this will be the lesson of WWI 
and Inter-Allied finance),  
a gold reserves is thought of as being some sort of charm, the presence of which is 
valuable quite apart from there being any idea of dissipating it, – as the emblem, rather 
than the prop, of respectability.  It would be consistent with these ideas to melt the 
reserve into a great golden image of the chief cashier and place it on a monument so 
high that it could never be got down again. If any doubt comes to be felt about the   31 
financial stability of the country, a glance upwards at the image will, it is thought, 
restore confidence. If confidence is not restored, this only shows that the image is not 
quite big enough (ib.: 313-14). 
 
While wondering why European countries had deliberately abandoned the “purposes for which it is 
rational to hold a reserve” (ib.: 315), Keynes speculated about the fallacy of composition which the 
“extreme force of circumstances” (ib.: 317) may engender. Alternatively, the War could lead to a 
radical innovation in matters of currency, and impose a new international regulation. To innovate is 
“practicable, as soon as people in general believe it to be so. The intellectual and scientific part of 
the problem is solved already. Only the will and the belief have not yet come”. Better, perhaps, to 
wait for “a catastrophic change”, causing gold to be “deposed from its despotic control over us and 
reduced to the position of a constitutional monarch”, until  
a new chapter of history will be opened. Man will have made another step forward in 
the attainment of self-government, in the power to control his fortunes according to his 
own wishes. We shall than record the subtle, profound, unintended, and often unnoticed 
influences of the precious metals on past historical events as characteristic of an earlier 
period (ib.: 320). 
 
Conclusions 
Keynes devoted his whole life to the attempt to reform the international monetary system. With its 
search for a more rational and stable basis than gold for the international currency standard, Indian 
Currency and Finance is founded on a critique of the model of commodity money (Cesarano 2003) 
which  Keynes  was  to  deepen  throughout  his  career  of  international  economist  and  negotiator. 
Suffice it to say that in his plans for Bretton Woods – the regime itself was to coincide with “the 
final stage in the transition from the commodity money to the fiat money” (Cesarano 2006: 3) – 
Keynes prompted for overseas transactions passing exclusively through the hands of central banks 
and  cleared  through  a  new  international  institution,  the  International  Currency  Union  (ICU). 
International  clearing  account  would  have  been  denominated  in  a  new  unit  of  account  and 
international currency, the bancor, expressed in terms of gold. But gold convertibility should have 
been one-way, i.e. the metal could only flow from national banks to the clearing bank. In short,   32 
bancor  would  have been  the  ultimate  reserve  asset  of  the  system.  As  Keynes’s  optimism  with 
regards  to  the  1914  crisis  makes  quite  clear,  Sayers  (1972)  is  right  to  emphasize  that  Indian 
Currency and Finance is a book of the first quarter of the twentieth century, when Keynes and his 
contemporaries “tacitly regarded the international gold standard as a system in which the strains of 
international  maladjustments  could  be  taken  care  of  by  international  capital  flows  properly 
influenced by central banks, and it was for this purpose that all major countries should have central 
banks” (ib.: 594). The interwar period would have  required much different instruments against 
fundamental disequilibrium.  
In  the  book,  Keynes  offered  the  picture  of  an  international  monetary  system  able  to 
conciliate, aptly managed through the use of exchange reserves held at the international financial 
centres of the core, the interests of debtor countries with those of creditor nations. After all, the pre-
war gold standard was characterized, to a certain degree, by multilateralism and dynamism (De 
Cecco, 1975). Relying on Britain’s ability to make the Empire finance its deficit with Europe and 
the US, and on the use of the discount rate as a means of attracting gold from the continent to match 
the “new” countries’ rapid development, the system ensured its reserve countries the possibility to 
face their short term balance-of-payments deficits while investing long term in peripheral countries. 
Though Keynes could scarcely be aware of it at the epoch, Indian Currency and Finance configured 
the first of a series of reform plans attempting to revive, under different forms, the “lost paradise” 
(Dimand, 2006: 175) of the pre-1914 internationalization he had so brilliantly described in the 
opening pages of The Economic Consequences of the Peace. WWI posed an end to the first era of 
globalization and, ruled out by the unbalanced international distribution of gold which resulted from 
war and uncooperative accumulation policies in the creditor countries, the gold exchange standard 
never materialized.  
Declining “from being the conductor of the international orchestra ... to less exalted status” 
(Moggridge  1986),  Britain  discovered  the  truth  –  she  was  victim,  as  any other  country,  of  the 
“dilemma of the international monetary system” (CW VI: 272), i.e. the apparent impossibility to   33 
satisfy the double need to “preserve the advantages of the stability of the local currencies of the 
various members of the system in terms of the international standard, and to preserve at the same 
time an adequate local autonomy for each member over its domestic rate of interest and its volume 
of foreign lending” (ib.). Once a relevant pillar and a fundamental stabilizing factor of the pre-war 
gold standard, foreign lending, namely the “process by which rich countries spread the proceeds of 
their wealth over the  world, and thus is internationally desirable”, could no more “be strongly 
supported on nationalist grounds” in the post-war gold standard, as Keynes would argue in his 1929 
lectures  (in  Fleming,  2000:  142;  see  also  Dimand,  2006).  The  system’s  lacking  a  responsible 
leadership  on  the  model  of  Britain  in  the  pre-war  period,  Keynes’s  view  of  economic  history 
progressively became that of a permanent conflict between creditors and debtors (De Cecco, 2001) 
which the ICU plan for an was destined to counteract through the issue of a supranational money 
replacing gold at the international level and the establishment of the principle of clearing with more 
symmetric rules for adjustment, as well as increased international liquidity.  
  In  the  paper,  we  try  to  show  that  the  legacy  of  Keynes's  “Bretton  Woods  0”,  i.e.  the 
international monetary system as shaped in its essential traits in Indian Currency and Finance, may 
still prove useful today, in the times of the Bretton Woods II system, to help policy-makers focus on 
some  of  the  latter's  major  faults.  Keynes's  awareness  of  the  changes  occurred  in  Asia  at  the 
beginning of the twentieth century parallels our inability to cope with the global imbalances which 
have developed as the spectacular effects, to use Keynes's words, of “a change of ideas in Asia”. 
True, this change, i.e. the passage from external borrowing to “undervaluation-cum-intervention”  
as development strategy, has been almost forced by the West on developing countries and deficit 
nations  after  the  East-Asian  crisis  through  the  imposition  of  the  tenets  of  neoliberalism  and 
aggressive financial liberalisation.  In a way, Asia has now “turned the tables on the West”, as 
Keynes observed in the prospected reversal of roles he pictured in Indian Currency and Finance, 
but  the  West  has  not  yet  learnt  how  to  avoid  leaving  “the  most  intimate  adjustments  of  our 
economic organism at the mercy of ...  a change of ideas in Asia”. By focusing on Keynes's book as   34 
an essay in international economics, it is possible to show that the legacy of his fresh look at Asia in 
the first years of the Twentieth century, of the “focus and method” of his analysis of the Indian 
monetary system and his proposal of a new regulation of the European standard on a more rational 
and stable basis than the gold standard, may help rethinking the need for a “rational” international 
monetary reform.  
  Contrary to the desired outcomes of Keynes's suggested reform, today's Bretton Woods II 
system  combines  expensiveness  with  instability  (see  Ocampo 2007). Not  only  should one care 
about the social costs of excessive exchange reserves – as seen, both the latter and their high costs 
are prominent features of Bretton Woods II. The mix of expensiveness with instability is due, on the 
one hand, to the use of a national currency, the US dollar, as the global reserve currency and the 
instrument for international payments. Since non-reserve countries’ demand for reserves grows with 
international transactions and reserves can only be accumulated by running balance-of-payment 
surpluses, as argued by Greenwald and Stiglitz (2006), “as long as non-reserve countries attain their 
desired levels of reserve accumulations, the reserve money currency country ... will be faced with 
chronic growing deficits (ib.: 7). In effects, the golden age of Bretton Woods owes much to the US 
willingness  to  comply  with  the  rules  of  the  Keynes  plan.  The  ultimate  creditor  country,  in 
Davidson's (2008) words, was willing and able to offer a permanent free lunch for all by accepting 
the major responsibility for solving international payments imbalances. A deflationary environment 
is on the contrary bound to result from the Bretton Woods II system and mercantilist tendencies on 
the part of many of its main players. On the other hand, the system’s instability has much to do with 
emergent countries’ demand for self-insurance, i.e. with accumulation of exchange reserves for 
purposes of protection from pro-cyclical capital inflows accompanied by limited possibilities, for 
emerging markets, to adopt counter-cyclical policies. The two recalled factors appear inescapably 
destined to produce an inequitable system and a not sustainable pattern of international economic 
relations, whose persistence increases the magnitude of the global austerity programme following 
the US financial crisis. Due to the inherent asymmetries of the global reserve system, the only   35 
possibility  to  avoid  “fallacy  of  composition  effects  that  feed  into  global  imbalances”  (Ocampo 
2007:  12)  lies  in  the  US  willingness  to  act  as  the  deficit-importer  of  last  resort  and  raise  her 
indebtedness at intolerable levels.  
  It is by adopting the “systemic” point of view, both for the past and the present, that we can 
appreciate the saliency of Keynes's analysis in the times of Bretton Woods II. Somewhat in line 
with Keynes's own attempt to ground the ICU on the virtues of the pre-war gold standard while 
avoiding its vices (see CW XXV: 40-66), it can be argued that what he himself considered as the 
legacy  of  his  early  international  economics  for  his  reform  plans  in  the  Forties  is  the  need  for 
international reform to achieve a system combining cheapness – as opposed to the costs unduly 
produced by the global reserve system – with stability – as opposed to the deflationary environment 
which it naturally tends to produce – and able to establish, in the name of the beneficial effects of 
economic interdependency, more sustainable patterns of relationship between debtor and creditor 
countries.  
  Keynes’s early essays in international economics were quite firm in their attacks on sterile 
and costly hoarding of gold, severely impairing the possibility to use it as a means of discharging 
international  obligations,  as  well  as  on  any  rationale  of  reserves  accumulation  significantly 
deviating from “reserves are to be used not shown”: countries were required by the ICU plan to 
make available for purposes of international adjustment those resources which they choose to leave 
idle. Contrary to Keynes’s message, the economic anxieties produced by financial globalization and 
the  Bretton  Woods  II  system  unduly  reduce  the  degrees  of  freedom  available  to  its  member 
countries. It reinforces tendencies to adopt mercantilist policies of the kind of those which the ICU 
was intended to oppose and induces less aggressive emergent countries to self-insurance strategies 
coming at high costs for themselves and for the stability of the whole system. 
     Obstfeld et al. argue (2008) that the growth of international reserves demanded by emergent 
markets should be understood as the attempt, on the part of the central bank, to protect countries 
from “double drain” crisis scenarios with banking problems and capital flights (that is, sudden stop   36 
of foreign financial flows plus domestic runs on currency) working together against stability to 
promote sharp currency depreciation. They find (2009) that in the first year of the current crisis, 
countries with small war chests have tended to depreciate, while those with more reserves relative 
to the size of the banking system have even appreciated. After comparing the different responses to 
the crisis given by three hoarding countries, i.e. Brazil, Chile (more limited use of reserves) and 
South  Korea  (active  use),  Aizenman  (2009)  concludes  that  the  success  of  the  general  strategy 
elaborated by countries opting for financial integration and managed exchange flexibility illustrates 
the  importance  of  the  self-insurance  provided  by  reserves.  Reserves  have  ensured  hoarding 
countries  a  soft  landing  and  the  needed  self-insurance.  However,  Aizenman  notes  that  “the 
reluctance of many countries to draw on their reserve holding raises the possibility that they may 
now suffer less from the well-known ´fear of floating´ than from a ´fear of losing international 
reserves´, which may signal a deterioration in the credit worthiness of a country. Mitigating this 
concern should be the prime responsibility of the international financial institutions” (ib.: 17).   
  Here is another reason why the endeavour to discuss the reasonableness à la Keynes, more 
than the rationality, of current informal international architecture should be performed exactly (and 
contrary to the advice of Dooley et al. 2009) in the times of the Bretton Woods II system. What can 
be rational for individual countries – the mix of self-insurance with mercantilist policies – might 
lead to a fallacy of composition at a global level, as argued by Ocampo (2007) with reference to the 
role played by reserves hoarding in aggravating global imbalances. Moreover fear and the forced, 
unnecessary  and  ironically  inefficient  adoption  of  neoliberal  strategies  are  at  the  basis  of  the 
rationality  of  reserve  hoarding  in  the  Bretton  Woods  II  system.  In  economics,  regulation  – 
deliberate decision, in Keynes's words – is an antidote to fear (see Stiglitz 2001). It is not difficult to 
find suggestions for a Keynes-inspired proposal of global monetary reform: the world needs a true 
global currency as a new, more rational and stable store of international value (Ocampo 2007), 
reserves accumulation should be decoupled from the deficit positions of reserve countries while 
more symmetrical rules for international adjustment would help the global economy to reduce its   37 
seemingly permanent imbalances (Greenwald and Stiglitz 2006). As known, Davidson (2008) even 
proposes to update Keynes's ICU original plan for today's world, stressing the need to avoid a lack 
of a global effective demand due to excessive reserve hoarding and to provide each nation the 
possibility to monitor or even control capital movements against financial contagion. What we have 
tried to show, however, is simply that revisiting Indian Currency and Finance offers us a valuable 
opportunity to look differently at the Bretton Woods II system as well as to rethink the need for 
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